The New York Times' DealBook reports that "Dan Burch of the proxy solicitor firm Mackenzie Partners lamented how some defenses aimed at thwarting activist proxy fights, like staggered boards that only put a small number of directors up for election in a given year, are failing. Many activists are now nominating full slates of director candidates, and companies are giving in by ceding some seats in any election."
What exactly is wrong with that? To be sure, there are cases where activist investors are wrong and the goals that they achieve do not maximize shareholder value. But I would posit that this is the exception, not the rule.
Activist investors -- who profit only from a rise in the company's share price -- are the only people who truly have their interests aligned with shareholders. Executives and directors may be motivated by salaries, perks, ego, etc.
In addition, activists generally move in on companies where the current management team's strategy has failed to generate value. Most companies that are targets of activist hedge funds have long track records of destroying shareholder value. A company that's been creating value at a good clip for shareholders has a compelling response to activists: "Our strategy has worked and we think it will continue to work. Leave us alone!"
Activist investors aren't a problem. They are the solution to the problem of a lack of accountability at the highest levels of public companies.
When activist investor William Ackman comes to town and starts buying your shares, you can bet he'll be hounding the board for changes soon. That's the case with discount retailer 
